Where to find Christian philosophy?: Spatiality in John Chrysostom’s counter to Greek Paideia by Stenger, Jan R.
 
 
 
 
 
Stenger, J. R. (2016) Where to find Christian philosophy?: Spatiality in 
John Chrysostom’s counter to Greek Paideia. Journal of Early Christian 
Studies, 24(2), pp. 173-198. (doi:10.1353/earl.2016.0015) 
 
This is the author’s final accepted version. 
 
There may be differences between this version and the published version. 
You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from 
it. 
 
 
 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/133535/ 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposited on: 26 January 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
WHERE TO FIND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY? SPATIALITY IN JOHN 
CHRYSOSTOM’S COUNTER TO GREEK PAIDEIA 
 
JAN R. STENGER 
 
Abstract 
This article examines the use of the concept philosophia in writings and homilies of John 
Chrysostom. Although Chrysostom in his discussion of intellectual achievements draws on a 
long-standing tradition of Christian apologetics he lends a new direction to the debate by 
highlighting the spatiality of philosophy. He not only counters Hellenic paideia with Christian 
wisdom, but locates these two types of philosophy in the city and the countryside, 
respectively. The article argues that the spatial dimension is vital to Chrysostom’s view of 
philosophy as he aims to extend the rural ideal of asceticism to the polis to create a healthy 
Christian community within the city. 
 
PHILOSOPHIES AND SPACES 
“Therefore, I beseech you let us introduce the philosophy from there also here, so that the 
cities become cities indeed. That is also able to improve the Greek, and to free him from 
countless offences.”1 In the conclusion to one of his homilies on Romans John Chrysostom 
imagines an apologetic argument with a pagan Greek opponent over whether it is possible to 
live a life according to God’s commands. What is striking in this passage, which brings 
together a number of main concerns in the preacher’s thinking, is the juxtaposition of 
intellectual activities with physical spaces or, more precisely, locations opposed to each other 
by spatial deixis. Apparently, he assigns a certain intellectual pursuit to a sphere outside his 
flock’s living environment, namely the desert, and opposes it to subtle Hellenic reasoning, 
which proves futile in the face of evidence for the true Christian life. What is more, 
Chrysostom seems to pursue two different goals at one stroke: on the one hand, he is engaged 
in an apologetic struggle against educated Greek opponents, who call into question the 
existence of true followers of Christ in their days. On the other hand, the homily is meant to 
reassure the members of the congregation that there are in fact men who practise what Christ 
taught. However, the faithful life, as it happens, is only to be found in the desert and the 
mountains, and Chrysostom evidently anticipates his listeners’ reluctance to forsake the 
amenities of the city to join the ascetic monks.  
At first glance, Chrysostom’s line of argument may seem just another contribution to the 
long-standing debate over classical paideia and Christian faith.2 Since he wants to prove the 
superiority of Christianity over Greek intellectualism he follows in the footsteps of earlier 
apologetic literature. Champions of a Christian faith that could be explained by rational 
arguments, such as Clement of Alexandria and Origen, already had made the case for an 
assimilation of classical learning as propaedeutic and shown that Christianity truly fulfilled 
what Greek philosophers only promised.3 Their very writings bore witness to the fact that 
Christians were capable of arguing to high intellectual standards and that faith was compatible 
with philosophy. By contrast, other Church Fathers and also the emerging ascetic movement 
laid claim to superiority over pagan paideia without any need of formal education. They 
emphasised that, in the tradition of the New Testament’s simple fishermen and tentmakers, it 
was not necessary to command rhetorical and philosophical skills, even though they put 
forward their views with the help of the very same skills. The seminal text of ascetic 
hagiography, Athanasius’s Life of Antony, had its protagonist utterly defeating the pagan 
philosophers, locating the deeper wisdom of the Christian in the remote desert, as Chrysostom 
does.4 We might wonder, then, why the Antiochene priest draws on this discourse before his 
congregation and, further, why he makes much of the dichotomy of spaces in relation to 
philosophical activity. An indication of the relevance of the spatial dimension is provided by 
the quotation’s bold claim that a translocation of philosophy will at once refute pagan critics 
and bring the city to its fulfilment.5 Yet, in what ways can philosophy be the key to the polis’s 
achieving its full potential? Chrysostom in this homily remains strikingly silent on that point. 
Although proposing the use of rhetoric and paideia for Christian ends elsewhere, 
Chrysostom in the homily on Romans goes to great lengths to insist on the yawning gap 
between Greek reasoning and Christian faith. That may seem surprising if we bear in mind 
not only the presence of well-educated citizens among his urban audience, both in Antioch 
and Constantinople, but also the fact that Chrysostom is credited with having coined the 
expression ‘Christian philosophy’, which unmistakeably betrays its close relation to Greek 
intellectualism.6 Since his homily on the festival of the Kalends is in general concerned with 
positioning Christianity as a distinctive way of life, it stresses the practical component of 
‘philosophy’ or, to put it differently, habits and customs with religious significance. At the 
same time, however, Chrysostom makes plain that to philosophise in the Christian manner 
also means to achieve an accurate understanding of Christian belief and to instruct others on 
ethics. It is therefore closely tied to cognition and intellectual activity.7 Although in using the 
term philosophia he stands in a longer tradition of Christians engaging with the classical 
heritage, he is the first author whose works attest the juxtaposition of the term with the 
attribute ‘Christian’.8 This would seem to indicate that early Christianity was indebted to the 
realm of Socrates and Plato.  
Chrysostom’s fraught relationship to Hellenic education, it is true, has not gone unnoticed 
in patristic scholarship. Studies have focused on his exploitation of rhetorical techniques9 and 
examined to what extent his ethics and anthropology draw on classical philosophy, 
particularly of Stoic provenance.10 His critical engagement with the paideia of the pagan elite 
has also attracted considerable interest. Tloka, with a focus on rhetoric, argues that 
Chrysostom legitimises a Christian use of classical oratory in functional terms and thereby 
justifies the place of intellectual abilities within the Church.11 Recently Laird in his study of 
Chrysostom’s anthropology has likewise emphasised that the Church Father’s education in 
Greek paideia was the basis of his intellectual framework; and Rylaarsdam has highlighted 
how Chrysostom’s pedagogy amalgamates classical culture into the Christian framework.12 In 
addition, Shepardson’s monograph on Chrysostom’s politics of space in Antioch sheds light 
on the ways in which he manipulates the spatial order to make the case for Christian 
orthodoxy and orthopraxy; in particular, Shepardson argues that the preacher inverts the 
traditional hierarchy between the city and the countryside so that rural Christians become a 
cipher through which he can challenge his urban audience on their cultural values.13 What she 
does not fully take into account is that Chrysostom’s spatial discourse on philosophy, as seen 
above, targets both his flock and pagan opponents. In the light of these studies, the present 
article intends to explore why he foregrounds the spatial divide with regard to culture, given 
that texts such as the Life of Antony had already situated Christian wisdom in a specific 
environment. It intends to go beyond Shepardson’s findings by showing that Chrysostom 
aims at not so much an inversion of normative geography as an extension of a 
characteristically rural way of life to the city. To address this topic, the article will first 
consider Chrysostom’s personal experience of the urban-rural divide. The main part of the 
discussion then demonstrates that his concept of philosophy centres upon the way of life 
rather than intellectual achievement and is profoundly shaped by a systematic dichotomy, 
which manifests itself in the spatial opposition between the Greek polis and the rural 
surroundings. Finally, it will be argued that the preacher invests the concept of Christian 
philosophy with spatial qualities to make the monastic ideal available to his urban 
congregation. 
 
THE RELEVANCE OF THE LOCAL SETTING TO CHRYSOSTOM’S LIFE AND 
THINKING 
Like any other eminent Church Father of his times, Chrysostom was well placed to consider 
the difference between established knowledge and Christian wisdom since he had become 
thoroughly acquainted with both during his life. Born into a family of the upper class in 
Syrian Antioch, Chrysostom received the traditional schooling, which would provide him, 
like any ambitious young man, with the knowledge and skills necessary to embark on a 
rewarding public career.14 He probably attended the school of the accomplished rhetorician 
Libanius for some years, where he will have acquired all the rhetorical techniques that would 
enable him to sway whatever audience he chose.15 Yet, instead of aspiring to a career in the 
imperial administration or the military, he bade farewell to secular education, under the 
influence of his mother Anthusa, who seems to have been a devout Christian. At some stage 
of his youth he joined the asketerion of Diodorus, not a religious school in the strict sense but 
rather a circle of young believers who shared their life and studies under the supervision of 
clerical teachers. However, not completely satisfied with this departure from traditional 
society and its values, Chrysostom fled further from the city to the surrounding mountains, 
where he sought spiritual consummation in the company of ascetic monks.16 After some years 
of monastic experience and due to damaged health, he returned to the bustling city and its life, 
to become a priest and preach to the leading congregation in Antioch.17  
The impact of his early years is recognisable throughout Chrysostom’s homilies and 
writings, as tensions abound between his ideal, the ascetic life of the hermits, and the urban 
way of life. What is important in our context is that he experienced different forms of teaching 
and learning and had the opportunity to recognise the interdependence between education and 
way of life or rather its locales. This personal experience left a deep mark even on his 
intellectual profile, as he addressed educational matters in a number of his works, especially 
those originating in his early career; there he betrays a constant wavering between promoting 
the monastic existence and acknowledging the interests of educated and well-to-do families.18 
He not only tackled this tension in his Against the Opponents of the Monastic Life, the letters 
to his friend Theodore and several homilies, but is also credited with being the first Christian 
author to devote an entire treatise to children’s upbringing, On Vainglory or the Education of 
Children.19  
It can be argued that the way Chrysostom became familiar with different approaches to 
pedagogy informed his views on education to a considerable extent. When we look more 
closely at his comments on teaching and knowledge, it instantly catches the eye how 
frequently he makes use of spatial terms denoting internal and external spaces. Certainly, 
mapping the intellectual domain in these categories had a long-standing tradition in Greek 
thinking, since Plato and Aristotle had drawn a distinction between teaching to a small group 
of followers and disseminating knowledge through lectures or written dialogues to a wider 
audience. Yet while Aristotle employed only the adjective ‘exoteric’,20 it was, as far as we can 
discern, not until the second-century satirical writer Lucian applied the term to the 
Peripatetics that the adjective ‘esoteric’ gained currency with regard to teaching and 
knowledge.21 Soon Christians adopted this linguistic practice and identified traditional 
philosophical schools through the spatial distinction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’.22  
However, this opposition also drew on a second, distinctively Jewish-Christian, tradition, 
as the adherents of Christ since New Testament times had been accustomed to distance 
themselves from other religious groups by referring to them as ‘external’ or ‘those outside’.23 
Subsequently the discourse of knowledge and that of religion acquired a connection in 
Christian thinking, to the effect that there was a practical linguistic expression for addressing 
differences between ‘them’, the pagans, and ‘us’, the believers.24 Chrysostom could rely on 
this entrenched habit when he referred to “outside education” (exothen paideusis), “outside 
philosophy” (exothen sophia) and “outside philosophers” (exothen philosophoi).25  
Interestingly, Chrysostom hardly ever uses the Greek word for exact knowledge and 
science, episteme, in this context. Nor does he reflect often on knowledge in the strict sense, 
as imparted by the schools. He rarely goes into details of the philosophical sects or teachings 
of individual philosophers.26 Whenever he does talk about formal Greek education, negative 
remarks outnumber the positive ones by far.27 Another established knowledge term, however, 
figures prominently in his discussions: philosophia, linked to wisdom and truth, is of 
paramount importance to, albeit not reserved for, Chrysostom’s conception of Christian 
religion.28 To be sure, he applies the word and its cognates also to traditional philosophy and 
its key figures. Among the Greek intellectuals he includes not only the ancient philosophers 
such as Plato but also contemporary ones without famous names, which were a staple feature 
of Hellenic culture at that time.29 He also distinguishes several disciplines of formal education 
by name, including astrology, mathematics, geometry and arithmetic.30  
However, Chrysostom’s genuine interest is in a different branch of philosophy. Tellingly, 
he talks about the “real philosophy” (ontos sophia) or even “our philosophy” (hemetera 
philosophia) and the wisdom “above”, in a move to appropriate the venerable term for the 
followers of Christ.31 As noted already, he goes so far as to coin the expression “Christian 
philosophy”, thereby claiming that this activity greatly differs from its pagan counterpart. All 
these qualifying attributes suggest that Chrysostom conceived of the philosophical domain as 
structured by a fundamental antagonism between two sets of practices, one of which is located 
‘outside’ and separated from Christians, while the other belongs to ‘us’. Following his spatial 
dichotomy, the next section shall outline the profiles of the two in order to illuminate the 
distinctiveness of Christian philosophy. 
 
THE DEMARCATION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL FIELD 
Considering Chrysostom’s predilection for visual terms and imagery, it comes as no surprise 
that he does not stop with the metaphorical meaning of spatial terms noted above. He seizes 
any opportunity to flesh out the contrast between the two philosophies with references to 
actual spaces. On one occasion, when he set out to teach his congregation the superiority of 
the heavenly goods, the service in the church of Antioch was attended not only by the 
members of his flock but also by some peasants from the Syrian countryside.32 Whether 
Chrysostom had anticipated this cross-cultural encounter or alertly adapted his homily on the 
spot, right from the start he phrased his instructions about Christian conduct in light of the 
gathering of urban and rural audiences:33 
Since the people who have this day streamed into our assembly from the 
country have made our gathering more brilliant, let us in return set before them 
a richer spiritual banquet filled with the same great love they have shown for 
us. [. . .] Let us not look to the fact that their speech is different from ours. Let 
us note carefully the true doctrine of their soul and not their barbarous tongue. 
Let us learn the intention of their heart and that they prove in deeds the things 
we, in our love of true doctrine, strive to teach by words. For they fulfil in 
deeds the precept of the Apostle, who bids us to get our daily bread by working 
with our hands. 
It is evident that Chrysostom in this opening of the baptismal instruction is extolling the 
virtues of the Syrian visitors as an excellent model of the blameless life, which his 
parishioners, even though they hail from a different cultural background, should emulate in 
the urban context of Antioch. The recurring use of the term ‘philosophy’, applied to the 
country folk and hammering the preacher’s lesson home to his audience, serves as a constant 
reminder of the ideal that ought to govern their lives. There is more to this passage than the 
presentation of an excellent role model, however. By elaborating on the contrast between the 
Syrians’ activities in the countryside and the habits common in the cityscape, Chrysostom 
prepares the ground for a comparison which helps to bring out the nature of his model. As 
anticipated by the constant reference to the key term philosophia, the inhabitants of the rural 
landscape are opposed to the philosophers, who seem merely to sport impressive beards and 
staves but fail to gain insight into the metaphysical realm.34  
It is not by chance that Chrysostom picks out intellectuals whose profession is 
recognisable from their eye-catching props. These representatives of traditional philosophy 
are staple figures in his sermons and writings, a stereotype that points to a social group rather 
than identifiable individuals. In several of his texts we encounter these characters, whose main 
properties appear to be the beard, the staff and the cloak.35 Needless to say, with this 
malicious mockery Chrysostom draws on the traditional satire on intellectuals that is familiar 
from the attacks of the second-century writer Lucian.36 The philosophers, who seek to affirm 
their commitment to their profession through their outward appearance, are prime examples of 
the urban mode of life. Obsessed with external splendour and striving for recognition from 
their fellow citizens, they live a life of phantasia, that is, vainglory and pretentiousness 
without substance.37  
Given that countless ancient philosophers decried the excesses of upper-class materialism, 
it is striking that Chrysostom links the intellectuals to city life, which is centred upon 
possessions, status symbols and ostentation. Repeatedly he insinuates a close association 
between the urban elite, with their fixation on wealth, clothes, crowds of slaves and 
reputation, and the representatives of Greek philosophy, to throw light on a shocking 
discrepancy, the gap between outward splendour and inward inanity.38 For instance, in one of 
the Homilies on the statues hardly has he contrasted the simple life of the monks with the 
luxuriousness and sinfulness of the city when he singles out the traditional philosophers as 
paragons of this corrupted existence.39 He projects all his vocally expressed prejudices and 
reservations about the urban sphere onto the group of the intellectuals, so that they epitomise 
the corruption of the townsfolk. 
Particularly in his early writings, when he was still under the spell of his experience as an 
anchorite, Chrysostom entertained the idea of implementing the monastic life in the urban 
environment, in the hope of virtually turning the city into a church or monastery.40 The faith-
based life of the monks appeared to him far more conducive to attaining spiritual edification 
and securing salvation than any effort within the city walls.41 Unsurprisingly, in his discussion 
of these opposing ways of life Chrysostom draws our attention to their local setting. Just as 
Greek philosophy figures prominently as the hallmark of the city, so the perfect embodiment 
of Christian virtue is to be found solely in the desert and the mountains.42 It is not only the 
Syrian farmers of the baptismal homily who are depicted by him as prime models of the 
conduct dear to God: rustic monks, dwelling in the adjacent mountains, fit the picture too.43 
Similarly to his portrayal of the philosophers, Chrysostom has a rough mental sketch of rustic 
life, which he applies to both the Syrians and the hermits. Both make only rare appearances in 
the cityscape, above all when an emergency or imminent danger arises, as was the case during 
the Revolt of the Statues in 387.44 Otherwise they avoid direct contact with the corrupting 
habits of the townspeople. The whole life of the peasants and the monks is a far cry from the 
behaviour and pastimes of the urban population, as the following passage makes clear:45 
For I think the present day to be a very great festival indeed on account of our 
brethren, who by their presence beautify our city and adorn the Church; a 
people foreign to us in language, but in harmony with us concerning the faith, 
a people passing their time in tranquillity, and leading an honest and sober life. 
For among these men there are no spectacles of iniquity—no horse races, nor 
harlots, nor any of that riot which pertains to a city, but every kind of 
licentiousness is banished and great sobriety flourishes everywhere. And the 
reason is that their life is a laborious one; and they have, in the culture of the 
soil, a school of virtue and sobriety and follow that art which God introduced 
before all others into our life. For before the sin of Adam, when he enjoyed 
much freedom, a certain tillage of the ground was enjoined upon him; not 
indeed a laborious or a troublesome one, but one which afforded him much 
good discipline, for he was appointed, it is said, “to till the garden, and to keep 
it.” Each of these men you may see at one time employed in yoking the 
labouring oxen, guiding the plough and cutting the deep furrow; and at another 
ascending the sacred pulpit and cultivating the souls of those under their 
authority; at one time cutting away the thorns from the soil with a bill-hook, at 
another purging out the sins of the soul by the Word. For they are not ashamed 
of work like the inhabitants of our city, but they are ashamed of idleness, 
knowing that this has taught every kind of wickedness; and that to those who 
love it, it has proved a teacher of iniquity from the beginning. 
In order to exhort his congregation to a wholesale rethink of their habits during an existential 
crisis in Antioch, the preacher sets before their eyes an image of a completely different way of 
life far removed from their own. While the citizens indulge in theatre spectacles, visits to 
brothels and every kind of sinful leisure, the men from the countryside are used to labouring 
with their own hands. With much toil and sweat, they themselves cultivate the fields and 
perform any task necessary in agriculture, instead of assigning menial jobs to servants as the 
inhabitants of the city are accustomed to do.46 Contrary to the framework of elite values, 
rustic simplicity in Chrysostom’s thinking is evaluated in a positive way; by his vivid 
description he brings the metaphor of agroikia, rusticity or boorishness, back to life and re-
values it.47 More importantly, the Syrian country people not only differ from the city dwellers 
by their devotion to physical labour: they also excel at praising God with psalmody and 
disseminating Christian belief with words. These activities stand in stark contrast to the urban 
philosophers, who usually utter pointless arguments. 
Yet the import of the passage quoted above emerges only from its Biblical reference.48 
Firstly, Chrysostom makes the point that the country folk actually lead a life according to 
nature, such as the Greek philosophers had long promoted but blatantly failed to practice. 
With their simple food, absence of any social hierarchy and equal distribution of possessions, 
the country people embody the primordial form of life, which is contrasted with the 
depravation so pervasive in the city. Secondly, the peasants resemble the first farmer of 
mankind, Adam. Elsewhere Chrysostom claims that the monks in their frugal and modest life 
emulate the angels.49 To put it differently, this wholesome conduct—contrary to urban life—
is a genuinely Christian one. And thirdly, the peasants’ occupations and virtues foreshadow 
the return of Paradise, a step towards alleviating the Fall. While the preacher implicitly draws 
also on the romanticising notion of the Golden Age familiar to the educated among his 
parishioners, at the same time he gives this common motif a distinctively Christian stamp. 
This opposition of spaces, urban and rural, is only one step, and not even the most 
important one, in a wider agenda. What is worth mentioning here is that spatial categories 
serve the aim of visualising contrasting life choices and so make the argument more powerful. 
It is these different attitudes to human existence that are Chrysostom’s core interest. At the 
heart of the matter lies the fundamental opposition between theory and practice. This issue is 
given particular prominence in a passage from a sermon on the gospel of John, in which 
Chrysostom elaborates on the difference between Christian faith and Hellenic philosophy:50  
A great blessing then is faith when it arises from glowing feelings, great love, 
and a fervent soul; it makes us truly wise, it hides our human meanness, and 
leaving reasoning beneath, it philosophises about things in heaven; or rather 
what the wisdom of men cannot discover it abundantly comprehends and 
succeeds in. Let us then cling to this and not commit to reasoning what 
concerns ourselves. For tell me, why have not the Greeks been able to find out 
anything? Did they not know all the outward [pagan] wisdom? Why then could 
they not prevail against fishermen and tentmakers, and unlearned persons? 
Was it not because the one committed all to argument, the others to faith? And 
so these last were victorious over Plato and Pythagoras, in short, over all that 
had gone astray; and they surpass those whose lives had been worn out in 
astrology and geometry, mathematics and arithmetic, and who had been 
thoroughly instructed in every sort of learning, and were as much superior to 
them as true and real philosophers are superior to those who are by nature 
foolish and out of their senses. For observe, these men asserted that the soul 
was immortal, or rather, they did not merely assert this but persuaded others of 
it. The Greeks, on the contrary, did not at first know what manner of thing the 
soul was, and when they had found out and had distinguished it from the body 
they were again in the same case, the one asserting that it was incorporeal, the 
other that it was corporeal and was dissolved with the body. Concerning 
heaven again, the one said that it had life and was a god, but the fishermen 
both taught and persuaded that it was the work and device of God. 
Again, in order to cast light on the superiority of faith, the preacher confronts it with its pagan 
counterpart, which, interestingly, is not defined in religious terms but consists in Greek 
philosophy. Once more, it is the notion of Christian philosophia that suggests this line of 
comparison. Painting philosophy with a broad brush, Chrysostom captures the essentials of 
traditional learning, including its champions, Plato and Pythagoras, its branches and core 
characteristic, the method of reasoning (logismos). What interests him most is that this 
approach to reality is subject to severe limitations and, hence, doomed to fail. Even though 
erudite Greeks are well versed in every domain of established knowledge, they fall far short 
of accounting for what is central to human life. The reason is that they are confined to 
applying the human intellect and its prevalent quality, rationality. With unconcealed 
Schadenfreude, Chrysostom notices that the Greek philosophers, despite their subtle 
argument, never reached consensus on what is of utmost importance—the human soul and 
God’s creation—, far less persuaded others. Fundamental to this sarcastic depiction is the 
notion that Hellenic wisdom relies completely on the human faculty of reason instead of 
recognising man’s limited abilities. The failure of traditional philosophy lies in the fact that its 
approach is immanent in the world here, so it can never reach to the heavenly realm where 
human life is anchored and finds its ultimate goal.  
Christianity, by contrast, is firmly based on faith and so is directly linked to God and, 
through his revelation, to real wisdom and truth. In a series of rhetorical questions and pointed 
antitheses the passage claims that faith surpasses any effort of human rationality and gains 
insight into the nature of the divine and the world. Since it is grounded in divine truth, as 
Chrysostom goes on to argue while glossing over fierce dogmatic conflicts of his times, its 
doctrines are consistent and persuasive throughout.51 The passage further intimates that 
rationality and theories are not even important to this kind of wisdom, let alone a precondition 
for it. In spite of their lack of formal schooling, simple fishermen, tentmakers and the 
unschooled emerge as the true philosophers. The superiority of their wisdom is manifestly 
proven, as if they had triumphed in a sophistic contest over Plato and Pythagoras. Similarly, 
St Paul, after God and Christ the most important teaching authority in Chrysostom’s theology, 
lacks traditional paideia, but emerges as the superior philosopher-rhetor, who persuaded far 
more people than Plato ever did. This suggests that what Chrysostom wants his congregation 
to imitate goes back beyond the monks of his days to the original Church and Pauline 
wisdom, whose foundation is divine pedagogy.52 
While in this passage Chrysostom allows us only a glimpse of what, instead of learning, is 
needed in addition to faith, he is explicit in the baptismal instruction mentioned above. There 
the significant distinction between the rustic Christians and the traditional philosophers 
consists in the commitment of the former to physical labour. They acquire and display virtue, 
not through learning and teaching, but through agriculture and a frugal life. It needs to be said 
that the saintly countryfolk occasionally ascend the pulpit to teach their fellow folk; likewise, 
they regularly practise psalmody. However, Chrysostom leaves no doubt that their core 
business is deeds, to the extent that words are unnecessary for teaching.53 It is by their actions, 
their vita activa, that they abide by the rules given by Paul and follow in the footsteps of 
angels. Furthermore, in agreement with Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount54 the farmers not only 
practise the blameless life but also encourage others to emulate them. The supremacy of the 
practice of virtue over the philosophers’ vita contemplativa is thrown into high relief in the 
nineteenth Homily on the statues, in a passage that repeatedly associates pagan intellectualism 
with the sphere ‘outside’:55 
For among these men [. . .] great sobriety flourishes everywhere. And the 
reason is that their life is a laborious one; and they have, in the culture of the 
soil, a school of virtue and sobriety and follow that art which God introduced 
before all others into our life. [. . .] Each of these men you may see at one time 
employed in yoking the labouring oxen, guiding the plough and cutting the 
deep furrow; and at another ascending the sacred pulpit and cultivating the 
souls of those under their authority; at one time cutting away the thorns from 
the soil with a bill-hook, at another purging out the sins of the soul by the 
Word. [. . .] These are our philosophers and theirs the best philosophy, 
exhibiting their virtue not by their outward appearance but by their mind. The 
pagan (exothen) philosophers are in character no wise better than those who 
are engaged on the stage and in the sports of actors; and they have nothing to 
show beyond the threadbare cloak, the beard and the long robe! But these, 
quite on the contrary, bidding farewell to staff and beard and the other 
accoutrements, have their souls adorned with the doctrines of the true 
philosophy, and not only with the doctrines, but also with the real practice. [. . 
.] And not only is this to be wondered at, but that they confirm the credibility 
of these doctrines by their actions. 
Labouring with one’s own hands is valued as a kind of professional activity or “art” (techne) 
so that it ranks among other honourable pursuits; it even functions as a school of virtue and a 
proof of Christian doctrines, thereby replacing the established schools and their ineffective 
curriculum.56 The rural way of life, as it happens, embodies the perfect harmony of words and 
deeds, or doctrines and practice, with words subservient to practice. Chrysostom aims to tailor 
a new robe for knowledge and philosophy: whilst the Greek philosophers miserably fail to 
translate theory into practice, Christian sages, without any formal training, bring virtue to 
fruition and, simultaneously, attain mastery of all relevant knowledge. This feat again links 
Chrysostom’s rural Christians with Paul because his main means of persuasion lies in his 
character, in particular in the virtue of humility and the imitation of Christ, instead of classical 
rhetoric.57 
The passages discussed so far are indicative of another fundamental opposition, which is 
inextricably connected to that between theory and practice. When Chrysostom insists on 
physical labour as opposed to the vainglorious and leisured life of the urban elite, he does so, 
for one thing, to lay stress on the peculiar quality of Christian philosophia. Further, he implies 
a social distinction, that of exclusivity versus inclusiveness. In this regard, it is telling that he 
is eager to associate the Greek philosophers with the pursuits and habits of the urban upper 
class: the inclusion of intellectuals among the affluent citizenry points to the fact that 
traditional schooling in antiquity required a substantial amount of time and money. Only the 
well-to-do could afford a lifestyle that provided them with sufficient spare time to dedicate 
themselves to intellectual pursuits such as philosophy, rhetoric, mathematics and music.58 
Even more strikingly, to devote one’s whole life to studies, as for instance Plato had done, 
was an option open only to those few who luckily felt no need to earn any money at all. Apart 
from these happy few, whoever attended the traditional schools in late antiquity nourished the 
hope of embarking on a profitable career, whether as an advocate, an official in the 
administration or a high-ranking officer. These aspirations of the urban elite are vigorously 
attacked by Chrysostom in his treatise On Vainglory, contrasting them with the care for the 
soul.59 Within the schools themselves, another social hierarchy cements the elitist character of 
Greek teaching. Since traditional philosophy is based on formal logic and argumentation—in 
the same way as rhetoric depends on the mastery of formalised techniques—there is an 
assignment of social roles to experts or authorities on the one hand and neophytes on the 
other, who have yet to complete their skills. It is this hierarchy of knowledge that attracts 
Chrysostom’s fierce criticism in a homily on the gospel of Matthew, where he dismisses the 
Pharisees and rabbis in all their elitism and boastfulness as a teaching authority alien to 
Christian religion.60 We can surmise that he had the same misgivings about the ‘masters’ of 
the Greek schools. 
In the same passage, which intends to promote the Christian virtue of humility against 
arrogance, the preacher draws an idealised picture of equal opportunity as implemented by 
Christianity. There we encounter the motifs familiar from the sermons discussed above.61 In 
stark contrast to the exclusivity of pagan philosophy, admission to Christian wisdom requires 
just one ticket: faith. Wealth, reputation, status symbols and methods of reasoning are not 
needed to attain knowledge of the divine and the world; what is necessary is a life of virtue 
and devotion. That is accessible to all, as long as they are prepared to bid farewell to the 
values that permeate secular society. Fine examples are, according to Chrysostom, the early 
followers of Christ: fishermen, tentmakers and tax collectors who, by virtue of their faith, 
were able to refute the elaborate doctrines of the philosophers.62 Thus, right from the outset, 
Christianity had a strong desire for an equal society, in which knowledge and truth are not 
restricted to a small circle of initiated intellectuals.63 That the superior wisdom is available to 
all is evidenced across Chrysostom’s oeuvre, which provides a host of exemplars embodying 
philosophia, from the first Christians to male and female martyrs of the previous centuries to 
the contemporary rustic monks.64 Christian wisdom spreads across all humanity, regardless of 
class distinctions or intellectual abilities. 
To take this societal aspect one step further we should take a look at the impact of both 
pagan teaching and Christian philosophy. We already mentioned in passing that, while the 
Greeks fail to live up to their lofty ideals, simple followers of Jesus by their very life and 
work teach others how to become an irreproachable person. At first glance it might seem that 
the pagan thinkers had a substantial impact on society, as they lay claim to a high reputation 
and display with every facet of their outward appearance that they are recognised as 
respectable and influential members of the civic community. With his scornful remarks and 
an eye for human frailty, Chrysostom lays bare the marginalisation and inanity of these 
figures. As the skirmishes between them show, they are primarily concerned with subtleties of 
logical reasoning, or rather with their own reputation.65 Offering contradictory and ridiculous 
opinions on abstract matters,66 the philosophers are far from convincing others, never mind 
changing the morals of their audience.67 And when their own morals and habits are put under 
scrutiny, these caricatures of philosophy68 are exposed as hypocrites who resemble actors on 
the stage, because they merely pretend to pursue serious occupations. Despite their ambitious 
principles, they are committed to a life of sensual pleasure, similar to dogs under the dinner 
table of the rich, which “do everything for the sake of the belly”.69 
An excellent opportunity to unmask the philosophers’ idleness came during Lent of 387, 
when Antioch was virtually threatened with extinction by the emperor Theodosius I. After a 
number of citizens enraged by new tax regulations had thrown down images of the emperor 
and his family, the city was trapped in an existential crisis over several weeks, awaiting 
imperial punishment for the lese-majesty. During this period, while both secular and clerical 
representatives of Antioch tried to negotiate a settlement of the dispute, Chrysostom delivered 
a series of homilies to his congregation in order to amend the situation.70 Significantly, he laid 
the blame for the riot squarely on the corrupted morals and sinful desires of his fellow 
citizens, without any patience with Christians among them. Since their habits—particularly 
their obsession with oath-swearing—had proved instrumental in the city’s downfall, it was 
essential to bring about a fundamental change of values and behaviour. With great pleasure, 
the preacher savoured to the full the memory of how the philosophers in the moment of 
greatest affliction had deserted the citizens to save their own skin:71 
Where now are those who are clad in threadbare cloaks and display a long 
beard and carry staffs in the right hand; the philosophers of the world, who are 
more abject in disposition than the dogs under the table and do everything for 
the sake of the belly? All these men then forsook the city; they all hasted away 
and hid themselves in caves! 
Instead of supporting the inhabitants in the face of death and offering consolation, the pagan 
intellectuals had nothing in mind except saving their necks. Egotistically, they joined the 
wealthy class in their precipitous flight to the mountains, where they hoped to escape 
punishment. This upsetting response to collective danger was another proof of the futility of 
quixotic academics that was so often derided in ancient anecdotes. In Chrysostom’s view, the 
philosophers had forfeited their claim to public engagement once and for all. 
With the monks, it was a completely different matter. At the same time as scores of 
affluent citizens were forsaking their fellows, one group set out on the reverse journey from 
the surrounding mountains to the city. That at least is what Chrysostom tells us in the same 
homily.72  
And the inhabitants of the city fled away to the mountains and to the deserts, 
but the citizens of the desert hastened into the city, demonstrating by deeds 
what, on the preceding days, I have not desisted from saying, that the very 
furnace will not be able to harm the man who leads a virtuous life. Such a thing 
is philosophy of soul, rising superior to all things and to all prosperous or 
adverse events; for neither is it enfeebled by the former nor beaten down and 
debased by the latter, but abides on the same level through the whole course of 
things, showing its own native force and power! Who, indeed, was not 
convicted of weakness by the difficulty of the present crisis? Those who had 
held the first offices in our city, who were in places of power, who were 
surrounded with immense wealth, and who were in high favour with the 
Emperor, leaving their houses utterly deserted, all consulted their own safety; 
and all friendship and kindred were found worthless, and those whom they 
formerly knew, at this season of calamity, they desired not to know and prayed 
to be unknown of them! But the monks, poor as they were, having nothing 
more than a mean garment, who had lived in the coarsest manner, who seemed 
formerly to be nobodies, men habituated to mountains and forests; as if they 
had been so many lions, with a great and lofty soul, whilst all were fearing and 
quaking, stood forth and relieved the danger, and that, not in the course of 
many days, but in a brief moment of time! 
With the monks’ intervention in the crisis Chrysostom’s argument comes full circle. The only 
defence against all evils and dangers is Christian philosophy as epitomised in the monks’ 
selfless endeavour. Even though they have no connection with the inhabitants of the city, they 
put their own lives on the line to rescue them, demonstrating by this act that they are actually 
their brothers. Paradoxically, the monks embody the true spirit of the city, the Christian city, 
that is, while the upper-class representatives of the classical polis forsake the civic community 
precisely when their action is needed. In the twinkling of an eye, as if their bare appearance 
was sufficient, the men from the countryside bring the dangerous situation to an end.73 The 
passage highlights the transgressional nature of the monks’ intervention, the entry of rural 
philosophy into the city, to argue that nothing other than this ‘worldly asceticism’ will secure 
the well-being of Antioch. To cut a long story short, the preacher sums up his lesson: “So 
great is the moral wisdom that was brought among men by Christ.”74 Though living a life of 
seclusion, the monks nevertheless bring their philosophy to fruition first and foremost in the 
care for others. 
This theme runs as a thread through Chrysostom’s descriptions of Christian wisdom. 
Elsewhere, when he sets out his views on the priesthood, he makes clear that public 
engagement of priests on behalf of others ranks above the undisturbed ascetic existence 
because it faces the greater challenges and proves beneficial not only for oneself.75 
Chrysostom’s occasional dissatisfaction with the ascetics’ withdrawal lays additional weight 
to the point that his aim is the formation of ‘worldly ascetics’, also embodied by Paul, rather 
than the tranquillity of the desert. It is true that this kind of philosophia results in the 
perfection of one’s individual life and eventually the salvation of the soul. The wise and 
virtuous believer will avoid anything that might distract him from this path, including theatre 
spectacles and cursing. The consummation of the true philosophy, though, manifests itself in 
the practice of charity in all its facets. That is why Chrysostom is keen to repeat the story of 
the monks’ intervention during the series of services held in this period.76 He wants the 
message embodied by the ascetics to take root and grow in the souls of his parishioners so the 
latter adopt the virtues of the former within the urban context. After the appalling boldness of 
some citizens has put the survival of the entire city at risk, a well-founded parrhesia, the 
frankness of speech before any authority and even before God, will maintain the welfare of 
the urban community forever.77  
The reason why in the wake of the riot the preacher dwells so tenaciously on the monks’ 
selfless assistance is not just that it affords him the chance of extolling the superiority of 
Christian figures over pagan leaders. It is particularly conducive to his argument because the 
monks can serve as living exemplars of his conception of wisdom.78 What is essential for the 
unfading success of Christian philosophy is that there be a personal relationship between 
those who are already advanced and those who are still at the starting point of their moral 
progress and in need of advice.79 The basic principle underlying Chrysostom’s pedagogy is 
emulation or imitation: since morals and behaviour are centre stage and have brought about 
the demise of formal schooling, it is imperative to furnish the novices with suitable models of 
the Christian life. Since he wants to make the monastic life a guideline not only for monks, 
but for all Christians he stresses the close ties between the rural ascetics and the urban 
population.80 That is also why Chrysostom repeatedly projects ascetic values onto Paul; by 
transferring the ascetic lifestyle to the Apostle he directs his flock back to the beginnings of 
the Church as a template for their conduct.81 The ordinary believers need living models, in 
addition to Biblical characters of ancient times, in order to mould their souls according to the 
religious virtues.82 Thus the social dimension of philosophia is operational not only in the 
practice of virtue, especially charity, but already during the pedagogical process. In the end, 
Chrysostom intimates, Christian knowledge will contribute to creating a humane urban 
society, which is tied together by mutual acts of love and the community of ‘teachers’ and 
followers. In this sense, cities truly become cities through philosophy. 
 
CONCLUSION 
A number of Chrysostom’s sermons, including baptismal instructions, Lenten admonitions 
and exegetic homilies, put forward a clear-cut and systematic distinction between two types of 
knowledge, strikingly couched in spatial terms. Associating Christian wisdom with the 
countryside and Greek philosophy with the cityscape, the preacher produces a fundamental 
dichotomy between the knowledge discourses that were competing for public attention at that 
time. Both paths promise to guide their adherents to the happy life; only Christian philosophy, 
however, delivers on its promises, because it offers superior insights, is consistent and 
persuasive and has a substantial impact on the individual as well as on society. The preacher 
contrasts his notion of philosophy with pagan intellectualism to furnish his congregation with 
a comprehensive alternative to paideia. 
What Chrysostom has to say about the Christian attitude towards Hellenic erudition might 
at first seem fairly unoriginal because he rehearses arguments that had been made by the New 
Testament and apologetic writers such as Clement and Origen. And yet, he makes a 
meaningful contribution to the controversy in the context of an increasingly urban form of 
Christianity at the end of the fourth century. As he addresses an audience largely socialised in 
the city Chrysostom acknowledges the need to adapt to their expectations by reconnecting the 
debate on the superiority of Christian wisdom to the local context. In spatial terms, he 
transfers Christian philosophia, as embodied by monks, from the desert to the polis, where it 
is utilised as a panacea for classical paideia, which had been valued as the hallmark of the 
Greek city.  
While the rising ascetic movement in general discounted urban culture as irreconcilable 
with the true Christian life, it was Chrysostom’s aim to make this ideal available to a larger 
number of people, ultimately to any believer. For him the monastic community, shaped after 
Biblical models, represents a perfectly equal society, an excellent antidote to the elitist vision 
of a society based on class and education. He therefore suggests ways in which the monastic 
life, or rather philosophy, can greatly influence and finally transform life in the city so that the 
classical polis is virtually turned into a monastery. That is why he, through the return of rural 
monks to the city, cuts across engrained ideas about city and countryside and blurs the 
boundaries between the two spheres that hitherto had been neatly separated.  
The spatial dimension then is not incidental, but in fact vital to Chrysostom’s critical 
engagement with paideia. For the sake of persuasiveness before an urban congregation he 
uses a shared mode of expression, the discourse on philosophy, to reveal Christianity as the 
true fulfilment of the goals of classical education. However, since the ideal of the Christian 
life is mainly located far from the Greek polis, Chrysostom needs to demonstrate that the gulf 
between the worldly life in the city and asceticism in the desert can be bridged. Only then can 
‘philosophy’ overcome boundaries between high and low, between city and countryside. 
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